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 　 When I visited Japan for the first time in June 2017, I was not surprised that I 
received many queries about the new U.S. president, Donald Trump.  How could 
he have been elected president? What is going on in America? Even the theme of 
this special issue indicated colleaguesʼ interest in understanding “America in the 
age of Trump.” 
 　 As a historian, I felt at a loss.  Given that I study U.S. history, I should have a 
better answer and more insight into why close to sixty-three million Americans 
voted for Donald Trump, a candidate with a documented antagonism to policy 
details, basic decency, and respect for evidence.  This was a man who came to 
political prominence by denying President Barack Obamaʼs citizenship. 
 　 At least I am not alone.  Rick Perlstein, the author of seminal books on the 
1964 Goldwater campaign and Richard Nixon, wrote a self-reflective essay a few 
months after the election entitled, “I thought I understood the American Right. 
Trump Proved Me Wrong.” He, too, questioned how he, an expert on American 
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conservatism, could not predict the mass appeal and eventual election of Donald 
Trump.  He concludes that most professional historians have been too quick to 
turn to William Buckley for answers and too reluctant to call out the extremism in 
the Republican Party.  He urges more attention to “conservative historyʼs political 
surrealists and intellectual embarrassments, its con artist and tribunes of white 
rage.” 1  This conclusion is sobering to say the least, and seems all the more 
prescient in the wake of the Neo-Nazi march in Charlottesville. 
 　 In a quest to make sense of our current political moment, I read a series of 
books and essays that offer a range of explanations for how and why the 
conservative movement succeeded in redefining the Republican Party and taking 
power: Jefferson Cowieʼs  The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of 
American Politics , Nancy MacLeanʼs  Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of 
the Radical Rightʼs Stealth Plan for America , Nancy Isenbergʼs  White Trash: The 
400- Year Untold History of Class in America , and Arlie Russell Hochschild, 
 Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right . 
These books were conceptualized and written before the 2016 election, but their 
2016 and 2017 publication dates have meant that readers, including myself, have 
gone to them looking for new answers. 
 　 Jefferson Cowie and Nancy MacLean, whose new books hit the shelves almost 
simultaneously, actually ignited a heated academic debate over the trajectory of 
twentieth-century American politics almost a decade ago.  In 2008, Cowie and his 
colleague Nick Salvatore published “The Long Exception: Rethinking the Place of 
the New Deal in American History” in a leading journal for labor historians, 
 International Labor and Working-Class History ( ILWCH ).  Cowie and Salvatore 
sketched out the contours of their argument: the New Deal marked a singular 
moment in American politics, the only time when the federal government 
supported collective economic rights.  Aside from the New Deal, economic 
inequality, corporate power, and individualism triumphed in American politics and 
cultural discourse.  They caution that American historians, the majority of whom 
are sympathetic to the New Dealʼs successes, should not expect a similar 
confluence of factors to jumpstart a new era of American liberalism.  In their 
vision, the New Deal was a seminal moment for American progress, but an 
exceptional one.  Theirs is not a Whiggish history.  ILWCH invited commentaries 
by several leading historians, and none was more critical than MacLean.  She 
 1. Rick Perlstein, “I thought I understood the American Right. Trump Proved Me Wrong,” 
 New York Times Magazine , April 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/magazine/
i-thought-i-understood-the-american-right-trump-proved-me-wrong.html?_r=2; also see by 
Rick Perlstein,  Before the Storm and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: 
Nation Books, 2001);  Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New 
York: Scribner, 2009);  Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2015).
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argued that Cowie and Salvatoreʼs analysis echoes conservative interpretations of 
the New Deal, and she suggested that their focus on individualism blinded them to 
the rich literature on civil rights and feminism. 2  Their two contradictory 
interpretations continue to drive their historical projects, with Cowie sticking to 
his thesis and MacLean analyzing the conservative forces at work against 
collective activism, government accountability, and the social welfare state. 
 　 Jefferson Cowieʼs  Great Exception consciously builds off this 2008 essay and 
offers a sharp new synthesis of the long twentieth century from the Gilded Age to 
Barack Obama.  The result is a largely persuasive account that asserts the 
fundamental conservatism in American politics.  In Cowieʼs terms, the New Deal 
was a “positive but unstable experiment.” 3  He believes the New Deal marked the 
golden age of American social democracy, and it unquestionably helped hundreds 
of thousands of Americans find greater economic stability.  However, he argues it 
was the  one time the U.S. government supported workersʼ rights to join unions 
and prioritized collective security over individual rights. 
 　 Cowie sees clear parallels between the late nineteenth century or the Age of 
Incorporation and the late twentieth century.  He sketches out how time after time, 
the U.S. government chose to support U.S. corporate interests at the expense of 
collective claims by working people.  To Cowie, this is not a matter of Ronald 
Reagan, or Donald Trump for that matter, but a long and steady tradition in 
American political economy. 
 　 Cowie also insists that America is fundamentally a socially conservative 
country.  One of his most original contributions is that he lines up the New Deal 
project to the era of immigration exclusion.  Between 1924 and 1965, U.S. 
immigration law largely restricted European and Asian immigration. (The 
thousands of Mexicans who entered during this era often had few rights and were 
seen as temporary workers, rather than future citizens.) Cowie offers that one 
reason the social rights granted by the New Deal were so widely accepted was 
because of the veneer of a homogenous American public.  With the renewal of 
immigration after 1965 and the successes of the civil rights movement, this 
consensus broke.  While many scholars, Cowie included, note how the Voting 
Rights Act was a turning point in political alignment, Cowieʼs inclusion of 
immigration policy proves insightful and consequential. 
 　 Cowie argues that American ideology is premised on individualism, which he 
states has been as “archaic as it has [been] enduring.” 4  In his view, the social 
 2. Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore, “The Long Exception: Rethinking the Place of the 
New Deal in American History,”  ILWCH , no. 74 (Fall 2008): 3 ― 32; Nancy MacLean, “Getting 
New Deal History Wrong,”  ILWCH , no. 74 (Fall 2008): 49 ― 55. Also see commentaries by 
Michael Kazin, Jennifer Klein, David Montgomery, and Kevin Boyle.
 3. Cowie, 15.
 4. Cowie,  The Great Exception , 26.
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movements of the 1960s and 1970s were successful because of their individualist 
and rights-based claims.  These held weight, while calls to economic security and 
expanding social democracy fell short: “The dual movement of the 1970s―the 
rise of the new social movements and the decline of labor―meant that those left 
out of the original New Deal package, women and minorities, sought their 
citizenship outside of the realm of collective economic rights.” 5  This is where I 
was less convinced.  In fact, women and minorities often sought their citizenship 
through collective economic rights, as Will Jones, Nancy MacLean, and Dorothy 
Cobble have shown, but they were often unsuccessful because of the intensity of 
the opposition from corporate interests and government disinterest.  The success 
of corporate America in undermining union rights, avoiding unions, and lobbying 
the government against expanding a safety net has been well-documented. 
Perhaps the language of individualism has triumphed, but only because of a 
marketed and well-funded campaign to do so, not because of its a priori value in 
American culture. 
 　 I would suggest that the history of racism, violence, and exclusion, far more 
than individualism, explain much of this paradox.  It is an uglier, and ultimately 
more difficult reality to live with, but it does not seem to be individualism per se 
but economic security for marginalized groups that causes such consternation.  As 
Perlstein cautions in his post-election mea culpa, Cowie accepts, but avoids 
lingering on the power of extremism and violence in the twentieth century. 
 　 In many ways, his conclusion falls into the trap I think many writers have taken 
up for years now, essentially blaming the Democratic Party for embracing 
“identity” politics of race, gender, and sexuality over “economic” issues.  This 
was at the crux of the Bernie Sanders campaign, and many post-election autopsies 
of the Democratic Party. 6  Cowie seems to concur: “The fractious polity, in turn, 
has chosen quarrels over individual rights, ethnic and racial hostility, immigrant 
versus native, and crusades over moralism, and piety in lieu of politics of 
collective economic security.” 7  Moneyed-elites (conservatives and liberals) hold 
power, and those without fight among themselves.  He concludes that he finds no 
comfort in telling the story of American history this way, but that the evidence 
points to a conservative history, and liberal historians are deluding themselves if 
 5. Cowie,  The Great Exception , 28.
 6. For just a sampling, see “The White Working Class,”  The American Prospect , June and 
July 2017, http://prospect.org/white-working-class; or David Remnick, “A Conversation with 
Mark Lilla on his critique of identity politics,”  The New Yorker , August 25, 2017, https://www.
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-conversation-with-mark-lilla-on-his-critique-of-identity-
politics. Also see a thoughtful piece by AHA president Tyler Stovall on historiographies of 
race, class, and identity politics. Tyler Stovall, “Race, Class, and History in the Trump Era,” 
 Perspectives on History , May 2017, https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/
perspectives-on-history/may-2017/race-class-and-history-in-the-trump-era.
 7. Cowie,  The Great Exception , 210.
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they search for a narrative that matches their political ideology. 
 　 In her new book,  Democracy in Chains , Nancy MacLean challenges Cowieʼs 
emphasis on individualism and remarks that “Many thinkers seek to explain this 
divergence by citing a uniquely individualistic culture.” 8  MacLean does not take 
up labor history or the legacies of collective action to make her case.  Instead, she 
zeroes in on right-wing ideologues who she believes have made the U.S. 
government less accountable to democratic majorities.  Like Cowie, she examines 
a broad sweep of time, from the early nineteenth century through the present, but 
unlike his synthesis, hers is almost a micro-history of one person: James 
Buchanan, a Nobel Prize winning economist.  MacLean wants to expose and 
condemn the ways in which elites of the conservative variety have manipulated 
American politics.  Her book has received a great deal of public criticism, with 
libertarians attacking her scholarship in multiple online forums, and questioning 
her sources and professional ethics, and others reviewing the book positively as 
revealing the interrelationship between universities, think-tanks, and conservative 
government. 9 
 　 MacLeanʼs book raises key questions about libertarianism, transparency, and 
the rules of American constitutional democracy.  Unlike those writers who have 
looked to Trumpʼs voters alone to explain the election, MacLean looks to the 
political and intellectual architects of American conservatism.  She finds them not 
at Tea Party rallies, the shop floor, or shopping at Wal-Mart, but in universities 
and corporate board rooms.  MacLean argues that libertarian academics, and 
namely James Buchanan, developed economic theories that are antithetical to the 
democratic process.  She argues that their faith in property rights and anti-
government ideology would be soundly defeated at the polls if given a chance.  As 
a result, Buchanan and his colleagues, and ultimately the Koch brothers, worked 
secretly to rewrite the rules of government to their own ends.  She writes, 
“American people would not support their plans, so to win they had to work 
behind the scenes, using a covert strategy instead of open declaration of what they 
 8. MacLean,  Democracy in Chains , 226.
 9. For just a few examples, see Jonathan Adler, “Does ‘Democracy in Chainsʼ paint an 
accurate picture of James Buchannan,”  Washington Post , June 28, 2017, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/28/does-democracy-in-chains-
paint-an-accurate-picture-of-james-buchanan/?utm_term=.39acdf77ea43; Henry Farrell, “Even 
the intellectual left is drawn to conspiracy theories about the right. Resist them,” https://www.
vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/7/14/15967788/democracy-shackles-james-buchanan-intellectual-
history-maclean; Marc Parry, “A New History of the Right Has Become and Intellectual 
Flashpoint,”  Chronicle of Higher Education , July 19, 2017, http://www.chronicle.com/article/
A-New-History-of-the-Right-Has/240700; Marc Parry, “Nancy MacLean Responds to her 
Critics,”  Chronicle of Higher Education , July 19, 2017, http://www.chronicle.com/article/
Nancy-MacLean-Responds-to-Her/240699; Sam Tanehaus, “The Architect of the Radical 
Right,”  The Atlantic , July/August 2017.
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really wanted.” 10 
 　 MacLeanʼs work is strongest when she remains focused on education―both 
libertariansʼ animosity to public education and the relationship between 
conservative donors and university politics.  MacLean spends considerable time 
on conservativesʼ vision of public education, and she draws connections between 
southern opponents of  Brown v. Board of Education and libertariansʼ support for 
private schools.  This history resonates strongly in the present since charter 
schools are seen as a contemporary panacea.  Given the attack on higher education 
over the past few years, MacLeanʼs focus on the university also seems timely. 
James Buchanan found his intellectual home first at the University of Virginia and 
then at George Mason University, which became pipelines for conservative 
lawyers and economists.  MacLean outlines how conservative funders favored 
certain academics and created networks that eventually wielded significant 
political power.  In this way, her work builds on Kim Phillips-Feinʼs  Invisible 
Hands . 11 
 　 I agree with MacLean that conservative Republicans ultimately wanted to 
“change the rules, not simply  who rules.” 12  The Republican Party has been at the 
forefront of gerrymandering and voter identification laws, which seek to limit, 
rather than expand the franchise.  It is no secret that African American, Latino, 
and lower-income voters are disproportionately targeted and affected by these 
laws.  Trump has started a “voter fraud” commission that is transparently hostile 
to voting rights.  Democracy in Chains touches on these topics, and it succeeds in 
showing the fragilities of the American political system; however, MacLean never 
thoroughly convinced me that Buchanan held as much power as she attributed to 
him. 
 　 In general, I wanted more information on how the ideas generated by Buchanan 
and others began winning elections.  MacLean emphasizes that these academics 
used “stealth” tactics, but much of what she writes about is out in the open today. 
The Republican Partyʼs anti-health care, anti-regulation, and yes, anti-suffrage 
policies are widely known, and broadly popular among conservative Republicans. 
It is true that Trump did not win the popular vote, but he did win close to sixty-
three million votes, hardly a marginal number.  MacLean writes that “there 
seemed no way to reconcile robust individual property rights with universal voting 
rights.  For how could the cause ever persuade a majority to agree to rules that 
might radically disadvantage its members in a society fast growing more equal?” 13 
But this is not necessarily true.  In fact, it is a fundamental question in American 
 10. MacLean,  Democracy in Chains , xx.
 11. Kim Phillips-Fein , Invisible Hands: The Businessmenʼs Crusade Against the New Deal 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2010).
 12. MacLean,  Democracy in Chains , 193.
 13. MacLean,  Democracy in Chains , 151.
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political history: why do white men and women, in particular, often vote against 
what would seem to be their economic interests? As MacLean well knows, there 
is an exhaustive literature on essentially this point. 
 　 And who were these voters? Arlie Russell Hochschild went to Lake Charles, 
Louisiana, about three hours west of where I live in New Orleans to answer just 
these questions.  In this book, self-described Berkeley liberal Hochschild went 
into the heart of Tea Party country to learn how it “felt” to be part of a 
conservative political world.  This community of white voters faced exceptionally 
high cancer rates, and yet resisted government regulation at all costs.  They voted 
for Tea Party candidates and Donald Trump, and they would resent and resist 
MacLeanʼs argument that their goals were fundamentally anti-democratic. 
 　 Hochschild sought to understand the families she meets on their own terms, 
and she grows to respect and enjoy them for their values, warmth, hospitality, and 
generosity.  She met Mike Schaff, Lee Sherman, and the Areno family, all who 
help her break down what she called her “empathy walls.” She wanted to develop 
real relationships with these individuals, and not sink into stereotypes or simplistic 
liberal punditry that blames the “white working class” for Americaʼs ills. 
 　  Strangers in Their Own Land was a National Book Award finalist, and it is 
strongest when dealing with the specificity of Louisianaʼs petrochemical 
landscape.  As someone who has now spent almost a decade in Louisiana, I was 
still shocked by the levels of environmental and medical risk due to the oil and 
petrochemical industry.  Hochschild zeroes in on environmental issues because 
she sees it as a crux issue, allowing her to analyze individualsʼ feelings about 
regulation, the government, and their community.  She tells remarkable stories of 
men and women who stood up to energy companies, admitted to violating 
environmental regulations, and in one case, held a sign at a public meeting 
admitting, “Iʼm the one who dumped it in the bayou.” 14  These stories are at their 
best when they lay out individualsʼ contradictions and articulate what is at stake in 
these rural communities. 
 　 Still, the book ultimately left me frustrated.  Hochschild offers a “deep story,” 
in her words, as this is a story of feeling, regardless of fact or judgment. 
According to Hochschild, this is the rural, southern conservativesʼ “deep story”: 
you are waiting in line, and the American dream is at the end, you have worked 
hard, followed the rules, and been patient, and then someone cuts in line ahead of 
you.  The “someone” includes women, President Barack Obama, and non-white 
immigrants.  Hochschild claims this “deep story” resonated in Lake Charles.  Her 
new friends “could no longer feel pride in the United States through its president 
[Barack Obama],” they would have “to feel American in some new way―by 
banding with others who feel as strangers in their own land.” 15  This “deep story” 
 14. Hochschild,  Strangers , 34.
 15. Hochschild,  Strangers , 138 ― 40.
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might be strongly felt, but what it attests to more than “line cutting” is a stagnant 
economy and an ahistorical vision of exclusion and disfranchisement.  Hochschild 
knows this, but she concludes the book with an imagined letter to a progressive 
friend with the following: she knows that there is racial intolerance and 
homophobia within the right, but she also wants liberals to understand the rightʼs 
“good angels,” “their patience in waiting in line in scary economic times, their 
capacity for loyalty, sacrifice, and endurance.” 16  In other words, racism and 
homophobia are sidebars to another story.  I am not as convinced the two can be 
so easily disentangled. 
 　 Taking a longer view on rural, white, southern poverty, Nancy Isenbergʼs 2016 
 White Trash tells a long durée about class in America.  Isenberg emphasizes the 
history of white, rural communities, and she argues land ownership and property 
rights have always been out of reach for Americaʼs poorest.  This created class 
hierarchies, which remain entrenched in American society, and which few could 
overcome.  Isenberg writes that the American emphasis on middle class identity 
ignored the reality of a lower class. 
 　 Isenbergʼs book is not a social history about working people, but rather an 
intellectual and cultural history of the “idea” of poor white America, and 
particularly white rural southerners.  Her book begins in the colonial period and 
North Carolina, Americaʼs first “trash colony,” and the emergence of what was 
called “waste people.” She analyzes early leaders such as Ben Franklin and 
Thomas Jefferson and their ideas of poor Americansʼ fixed place in society.  She 
explains how British ideas of breeding were fundamentally racialized and made it 
difficult, if not impossible, for white rural families to advance their class status. 
The book then moves forward in time with chapters on Andrew Jackson, the Civil 
War, the Great Depression, and the mid-twentieth century. 
 　 Isenberg wrote her book before Trumpʼs election, and her final chapter is oddly 
prescient, and as explanatory as any of the other books cited above.  She ends not 
with analyses of individualism or libertarian intellectuals, but with reality 
television.  She argues that the roots of reality television can be found in 1980s 
televangelism and their scandals.  She connects the dots between country singer 
Dolly Parton, televangelist Tammy Faye Bakker, and President Bill Clinton as 
bringing “redneck” culture to national television.  Isenberg notes that shows like 
 Duck Dynasty and  Here Comes Honey Boo Boo thrived on “emotion-producing 
competition” and scandal. 17  Even though Trump is a New York invention, and he 
himself insists on his hyper-wealth, she notes  The Apprentice succeeded because 
of “untrained stars ... in expectation that, as mediocrities, they could be relied on 
to exhibit the worst of human qualities: vanity, lust, and greed.” 18 
 16. Hochschild,  Strangers , 234.
 17. Isenberg, 307.
 18. Isenberg,  White Trash , 306.
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 　 Pulitzer Prize author Emily Nussbaum makes a similar argument in the July 
31st issue of the  New Yorker . 19  Nussbaum traces how  The Apprentice launched 
Donald Trump from a washed-up real estate B-level celebrity into a reality 
television star.  Nussbaum also comes to the uncanny realization that old episodes 
of  The Apprentice are not easily accessible for sale or online.  Here is a curiously 
elusive and important digital archive.  As she watches old episodes, she notes the 
almost innocent fun of the show: 
 In many ways, “The Apprentice” is a classic reality show of the era, a sleek blend of 
game show, documentary, and soap opera, spiked with comedy.  And yet “The 
Apprentice” is also “classy,” in Trumpian terms: no one eats bugs or gets too drunk.  
Itʼs a fun, upscale fantasy, a voguing competition in executive realness. 20 
 Nussbaum traces Trumpʼs trajectory as a reality television star and the numerous 
reiterations of  The Apprentice , his appearance and investment in World Wrestling 
Entertainment (WWE), and his ubiquitous product placement.  She concludes that 
his presidential run did not allow him the creative control he was accustomed to, 
and so he turned on the media, when he could no longer control the lights, the 
editing, or the final act.  Nussbaum characterizes Trump as an “old man, yelling at 
the screen,” but I for one do not want to underestimate President Trumpʼs media 
savvy. 
 　 As I write this review weeks after the Charlottesville protests and the murder of 
Heather Heyer, rains pour down on Houston, a city which will need billions of 
federal dollars.  Not surprisingly, and perhaps not fairly, none of these works feels 
satisfying to understand American politics today.  Perhaps that is asking for too 
much from a single book.  Cowie provides historians with a sharp frame and new 
synthesis, and I can imagine assigning his book to students in undergraduate and 
graduate courses.  I believe he is right that New Deal politics will not return, and 
if progressive politicians are to retake the federal government, it will be under 
very different terms.  MacLeanʼs book recognizes that elites are as likely to be 
conservatives as they are to be liberals, and she keeps her eye on centers of power. 
Her conclusion that Republican and libertarian power brokers have a 
fundamentally antidemocratic politics is sobering.  Cowie might say that their 
support for private corporate interests at the expense of democratic majorities is 
 19. Emily Nussbaum, “The TV that created Donald Trump,”  New Yorker , July 31, 2017, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/31/the-tv-that-created-donald-trump. See also 
David Friend, “The 1990s gave us the Trump Teens,”  New York Times , September 1, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/opinion/sunday/trump-reality-tv-90s.html?mcubz=0. 
Also see Naomi Klein, “If itʼs all about the brand, letʼs jam it up,” Boston Globe, June 7, 2017, 
h t tp : / /www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/06/07/a l l -about- t rump-brand- le t -
jam/2B04HBUWRIUezWQTEu9jnI/story.html.
 20. Nussbaum, “The TV,” 2017.
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nothing new.  Finally, Isenberg and Hochschild take different approaches, one a 
sociological and one an intellectual history, into white rural politics, and they 
explore the legacies of class and racial politics on communities far outside urban 
centers. 
 　 In July 2016, three months before the election, party leader and Democratic 
Senator Chuck Schumer said, “For every blue-collar Democrat we will lose in 
western Pennsylvania, we will pick up two or three moderate Republicans in the 
suburbs of Philadelphia.” 21  He was wrong.  As analysts are starting to recognize, 
Trumpʼs voters were not limited to white working-class men and women; they 
also included large numbers of affluent white men and women.  Political scientists 
Nicholas Carnes and Noam Lupu have shown that a large portion of Trumpʼs 
voters may not have had a college education, but that does not mean they were 
working class or disadvantaged.  In fact, a significant percentage earned more 
than $100,000 per year. 22 
 　 I think Nussbaum and Isenberg are on to something in their emphasis on reality 
television and celebrity culture.  It seems as convincing as anything as to how 
Trump continued to win the Republican primaries and ultimately the White House
―he remained the most fixating media presence.  This is not to ignore Perlsteinʼs 
calls to pay more attention to extremists or Cowieʼs long political history, or 
Hochschildʼs intimate sociological study, but all I know is that I am watching a 
reality television show.  And I cannot turn it off. 
 21. Dan Balz and Philip Rucker, “In final 100 days, Clinton and Trump to chart different 
paths to White House,”  Washington Post , July 30, 2016.
 22. Nicholas Carnes and Noam Lupu, “Itʼs time to bust the myth: Most Trump voters were 
not working class,”  Washington Post , June 5, 2017.
